
Multi-Level Markets for Virtual Goods


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Evolution of online media distribution – Convergence of white and grey market



Why convergence?

Status:

- Centralised distribution with copyright protection is not effective in *mitigating free-riding*
- The economic effect of free-riding is disputed

Problems:

- In the presence of free versions of content on file-sharing networks, centralised content business models are lacking a *sound economic foundation*, because
- Illegal and legal versions live in very different distribution nets and therefore
- It is not possible to model and assess the *competition* between the two

Consequences:

- Paid for and freely available versions of virtual goods should live in similar environments to
- allow for a sound *market mechanism design* to
- generate *revenue streams for originators* that
- make *original creation and production economically viable*

Incentive systems by network marketing

The first-best approach to

- generate revenues for the originator and
- provide incentives to re-distribute the legal version of a virtual good is a *commission model*.


Specifically, consider **Multi-level incentive Mangament (MLIM) systems**:

- Originator is a monopolist for the legal version and determines sales and resale price
- Buyers receive the good *and* the right to resell it
- Resellers receive a share of the resale price paid by buyers (both called *agents*) as an *incentive* for redistribution
- Remaining revenue goes to a *collector* (e.g. originator, creating artist, collecting society)
- The incentives discriminates legal and illegal version

This model (++) is realised in the Potato system

Problems and questions:

- Closeness in concept to *pyramid schemes* – when is MLIM considered *fair*?
- Lack of *theoretical models* for multi-level and network markets; required to examine quantitatively
- expected incentives,
- effectiveness against free-riding, and
- Competition between goods



A continuous (fluid) model

The *number* of agents $n(t)$ in the market increases continuously with time up to the *saturation value* n_∞

The *incentive* is the *resale revenue* minus the *price paid* (expectation values, commission, transaction costs etc. left aside)

$$v_i(t) = v_r(t) - \pi(t)$$

Price varies continuously

Ansatz $v_r(t) = \int_t^\infty \frac{\pi(t')}{n(t')} \dot{n}(t') dt'$

Influx of agents

Revenues are gained from later market entrants

Expected revenue is diminished by competition

Re-parametrisation by the *market saturation*
 $s = n/n_\infty, 0 \leq s \leq 1$ yields

$$v_i(s) = \int_s^1 \frac{\pi(s')}{s'} ds' - \pi(s)$$

- A flexible, generic model for the *monetary flux* multi-level markets
- Easily extended, by commission, transaction costs, and other features

Some rigorous results

- If the price is bounded then holds the conservation law (zero-sum condition)

$$\int_0^1 v_i(s) ds = 0$$

- The incentive is scale-free, i.e., independent of the final market size, at given saturation
- The price is positive at all times if and only if

$$\frac{1}{s} \int_0^s v_i(\sigma) d\sigma > v_i(s) \text{ for all } s$$

Expected incentive before s on average

Expected incentive at s

- The inversion formula

$$\pi = -\frac{1}{s} \int_0^s \sigma v_i(\sigma) d\sigma$$

allows to calculate price from incentive target


- The error between discrete and continuous market model is bounded by

$$|v_i(s) - \bar{v}_i(sn_\infty)| \leq \frac{\pi_{\max}}{2} \left[\frac{1+s}{sn_\infty} + \frac{1}{6} \frac{1+s^2}{(sn_\infty)^2} + O\left(\frac{1+s^4}{(sn_\infty)^4}\right) \right]$$


Examples

Dashed: prices, thin solid: expected resale revenues, thick solid: incentives


- a) - Constant, non-zero prices entail a *logarithmic singularity* at low saturations
 - Strong *favouritism of early buyers*, later market entrants are increasingly penalised




- b) - An *early subscriber discount* avoids the singularity
 - Can provide an initial *invitation to enter* to counter slow start-up



- c) - Early subscriber discount plus late-comer rebate
 - Effective *closure of the market* at a predetermined size
 - price peaks during an intermediate period, perhaps when demand is high



- d) - The effect of a collector (commission factor) is rather limited



A simple model for competition in an MLIM system

Assume two goods A and B compete in the same MLIM market as *substitute goods*

Their *market shares* are ($\bullet = A$ or B)

$$s^\bullet = s^\bullet(s) \quad s^A + s^B = s$$

The *decision probability* governs the evolution of market shares by

$$s^A(s) = \int_0^s \rho^A(s') ds'$$

Probability to decide for A at saturation s

The decision probability is determined by the distribution of individual utilities of A, B across the agent population. Three main contributions:

1. *Popularities* are probability distributions

$$\mu^\bullet(u^\bullet) = \mu(p^\bullet, u^\bullet) \quad p^\bullet \geq 0$$

Popularity distribution PDF

Popularity parameter

and satisfy principle of *stochastic dominance*


$$\mathcal{M}(q, x) \geq \mathcal{M}(p, x) \quad \text{for } p \geq q$$

CDF

If pop. is generated by *translation*, only the *popularity bias*

$$\Delta p = p^A - p^B$$

contributes



2. *Incentive bias* "I choose A over B because I expect to obtain a larger incentive from it"

$$\Delta u_i = \Delta u_r - \Delta \pi \quad \Delta x \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} x^A - x^B$$

Exp. resale revenue difference

price difference

Bounded knowledge estimation of resale revenue

$$u_r^\bullet(s) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} v_r^\bullet(s) \cdot \rho^\bullet(s)$$

Expected resale revenue difference

$$v_r^\bullet(s) = \int_s^1 \pi^\bullet / s' ds'$$

Decision probability by popularity only

3. *Multiplier bias* (a largely unknown factor) accounts for positive network effects on competition

$$u_m^\bullet \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \varepsilon s^\bullet / s$$

Complete specification

$$\rho^A(\Delta) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \Pr(\Delta u + \Delta > 0)$$

Individual popularity bias

Incentive & multiplier bias

Simplified (distributions of translation form)

$$\rho^A(p^A, p^B; \Delta) = \int_0^\infty d\mu(u) \mathcal{M}(u + \Delta + \Delta p)$$

With the total decision bias


$$\Delta \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \Delta u_i + \Delta u_m = v_r^A \rho^A - v_r^B \rho^B - (\pi^A - \pi^B) + \varepsilon \left(\frac{2s^A}{s} - 1 \right)$$

Experimental results on the free-rider phenomenon

Goods A and B enjoy the *same popularity* and B is freely available

$$p^A = p^B \quad \pi^B = 0.$$

Price of A is determined by spike functions, parameterised by maximum m




Main observables are *final shares*



$$S^\bullet \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} s^\bullet(1)$$

and *turnovers*

$$T^\bullet \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} t^\bullet(1) \quad t^\bullet(s) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \int_0^s \pi^\bullet(s') \rho^\bullet(s') ds'$$



Experimental results on the free-rider phenomenon – final shares and turnovers



- To optimally align incentives with market evolution is generally difficult
- Maximising shares viz. turnovers are conflicting goals

(Dis)similarity to illicit schemes

- MLM carries negative connotations special forms (pyramid selling, snowball systems, chain-letters,...) are illegal under many jurisdictions
- Micklitz *et al.* present criteria to discriminate legitimate schemes from illicit ones
- Applied to MLIM they yield five main arguments in its favour:
 1. **Inventory loading** (large, non-returnable stocks) is irrelevant for virtual goods
 2. **Marginal costs** for replication and redistribution are negligible, transaction costs insignificant.
 3. **Incentives result from individual sales** of a virtual good of positive pecuniary value, not favouring recruitment over resale
 4. **Down-line payments** (more than one level) are excluded – would only increase the advantage of early subscribers and punish late-comers
 5. **Information** about mechanism and incentive schedule can be made public in MLIM

Effectiveness of MLIM in the free-rider problem

- By the zero-sum condition, buyers of the legal good are not worse off on average than free riders
- However will an equilibrium $S > 0$ evolve dynamically?
- The competition model gives some positive indication
- **But**
 - if the price schedule is *common knowledge*
 - then late-comers will know by the z.-s. cond., that their incentive is negative and
 - not buy the legal version
 - **By induction**, no one buys the legal version
- **On the other hand**
 - If the price schedule is merely *public knowledge* or even only *private knowledge* (of the originator, say)
 - then some agents know that others will have negative incentive
 - but expect those to buy the legal good (from them) nonetheless
- Success of MLIM against free-riding is a genuine question of *information economy*
- This has to be taken account in mechanism design
- A multi-factor discrimination of the legal version is likely (watermarking, added value, etc.)

Dynamical forward pricing

- To dynamically control the incentive by the price is a salient, new possibility of MLIM
- Enables new mechanism design options, such as
 - market closure
 - early subscriber discount
 - late adopter rebate
- Information is crucial to successful operation – required to implement a price schedule is knowledge of
 - $n(t)$ – possible if, e.g., a central server counts every acquisition
 - the final market size n_{∞} – hard to estimate, in particular in a competitive situation
 - forced market closure, e.g., by setting the price to zero after a certain time or at a given market size, suggests itself
- Mixed forms seem reasonable
 - correlate price with buying frequency
 - frequency or price thresholds for market closure

Market (In)homogeneity

- Present model is *structureless*, i.e.,
 - the market looks the same everywhere
 - all agents have equal probability to trade with each other
 - no topological assumptions on the underlying communication and transaction network
- The *homogeneity assumption* breaks down if
 - There is a (group of) agent(s) with higher marketing and trading capacity and/or
 - Small inhomogeneities are amplified by multiplier or other network effects
- Cannibalisation of the market can occur if a strong reseller obtains a quasi-monopoly at an early stage
- Other buyers' incentives are negatively affected
- Can and should the MLIM system homogenise the market, e.g., by
 - limiting resale volumes or frequencies
 - providing an equal marketing platform to all

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